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INTRODUCTION
On a late summer evening in August of 1997, Nathan Brown was in
his apartment rocking his young daughter to sleep when the police
knocked on his door.1 The police sought Brown, one of a few Black men
in his apartment complex, after a young White woman said she had been
assaulted by a shirtless Black man wearing black shorts with strong body
odor walking through the complex’s courtyard.2 Minutes later the police
took Brown outside and put him in the patrol car for a one-on-one
“showup.”3 They brought him out by himself to see the victim wearing
black shorts without a shirt, and she quickly identified him as her attacker,
even though he lacked a strong body odor.4 The victim explained later
* University of Michigan Law School, J.D. Candidate, May 2016.
1. Louisiana Man Is Freed from Prison after DNA Results Prove His Innocence in Attempted
Rape Conviction, INNOCENCE PROJECT BLOG (Jun. 4, 2014, 2:35 PM), http://www.innocence
project.org/news-events-exonerations/louisiana-man-is-freed-from-prison-after-dna-results-
prove-his-innocence-in-attempted-rape-conviction [hereinafter Louisiana Man].
2. Id.
3. Id. A showup is the “presentation of a single suspect to a witness on the street shortly
after the crime.” Keith A. Findley, Judicial Gatekeeping of Suspect Evidence: Due Process and Eviden-
tiary Rules in the Age of Innocence, 47 GA. L. REV. 723, 768 (2013).
4. Louisiana Man, supra note 1.
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that she believed he had showered right after the attack, meaning he was
her attacker.5
The victim again identified Brown as her attacker at trial.6 Though
Brown took the stand in his own defense and testified that he was home at
the time of the attack caring for his “fussy infant daughter”—an alibi cor-
roborated by four of his family members—he was convicted of attempted
aggravated rape and sentenced to twenty-five years in prison on the basis of
the victim’s identification alone.7 In June 2014, Brown was exonerated of
the crime when DNA evidence revealed that he could not have been the
attacker.8 The DNA evidence was an exact match to a seventeen-year-old
Black male who had been living within blocks of the apartment complex
where the victim had been attacked.9 Nevertheless, Brown spent nearly
seventeen years in prison for a crime that he did not commit.10
Brown’s story is one of many false convictions that have occurred
because of mistaken eyewitness identifications. Innocence Project statistics
show that mistaken identifications account for approximately seventy-two
percent of the 321 wrongful convictions11 in the United States that have
since been overturned by DNA evidence.12 Of the 330 people exonerated
through DNA evidence, forty percent are the result of mistaken cross-
racial identification,13 which “occurs when an eyewitness is asked to iden-
tify a person of another race.”14 The police procedures used in investigat-
ing the attack and convicting Brown likely exacerbated the fallibility of the
cross-racial identification.15
Part I of this Note will examine “own-race bias”16 and its effect on
eyewitness identification. Part II will discuss Supreme Court precedent on







11. An Examination of Why Innocent People Are Locked Up, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://
www.innocenceproject.org/news-events-exonerations/an-examination-of-why-innocent-peo
ple-are-locked-up (last visited Oct. 11, 2015).
12. The Causes: Eyewitness Misidentification, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.inno
cenceproject.org/understand/Eyewitness-Misidentification.php (last visited Dec. 29, 2014).
13. DNA Exonerations Nationwide, INNOCENCE PROJECT 1-2 (Sept. 3, 2015, 12:30 PM),
www.innocenceproject.org/Content/DNA_Exonerations_Nationwide.php.
14. State v. Cromedy, 727 A.2d 457, 461 (N.J. 1999), abrogated by State v. Henderson, 27
A.3d 872 (N.J. 2011).
15. See BRIAN L. CUTLER & MARGARET BULL KOVERA, EVALUATING EYEWITNESS
IDENTIFICATION 37 (2010); BRANDON L. GARRETT, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: WHERE
CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS GO WRONG 49-50, 52-53 (2011).
16. See CUTLER & BULL KOVERA, supra note 15.
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are on trial as a result of eyewitness misidentifications.17 Part II will also
survey how state courts are addressing the problems of cross-racial identifi-
cation in the absence of Supreme Court guidance.18 Part III will then
examine proposed police practice reforms that can help to stop mistaken
identifications as the result of the cross-race effect.19 Finally, Part IV will
argue that federal courts should have a per se rule granting an expert wit-
ness the ability to testify to the unreliable nature of cross-racial identifica-
tions in cases where the defendant is represented by a public defender or by
private counsel under the Criminal Justice Act and where the cross racial
identification is the primary evidence used against the defendant.
I. OWN-RACE BIAS AND ITS IMPACT ON EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY
This section will examine own-race bias and its effect on eyewitness
identification.  A study conducted in 1988 asked whether people are more
accurate in identifying members of their own racial or ethnic group.20 In
the study, White, Black, and Hispanic customers were asked to visit a con-
venience store in El, Paso Texas, and interact with White, African-Ameri-
can, and Hispanic clerks.21 The customers engaged with the clerks in odd
ways, such as paying for their purchases entirely with pennies.22 Two to
three hours later, an investigator asked the clerks to identify the customers
17. See Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 112-13 (1977) (stating that it would be “Dra-
conian” to reverse a case using a reliable eyewitness identification that was obtained using an
“unnecessarily suggestive identification procedure”); Perry v. New Hampshire, 132 S. Ct. 716,
730 (2012) (holding “that the Due Process Clause does not require a preliminary judicial inquiry
into the reliability of an eyewitness identification when the identification was not procured under
unnecessarily suggestive circumstances arranged by law enforcement”); United States v. Ash, 413
U.S. 300, 321 (1973) (holding that the “Sixth Amendment does not grant the right to counsel at
photographic displays conducted by the Government for the purpose of allowing a witness to
attempt an identification of the offender”); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 297 (1967) (refusing
to retroactively apply two cases that would “deter law enforcement authorities from exhibiting
an accused to witnesses before trial for identification purposes without notice to and in the
absence of counsel”); CUTLER & BULL KOVERA, supra note 15; GARRETT, supra note 15, at 53-
54.
18. See State v. Madison, 536 A.2d 254 (N.J. 1988); see also State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d
872, 917 (N.J. 2011).
19. See Eyewitness Identification Reform, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocence
project.org/understand/Eyewitness_Misidentification_Reform.php (last visited Dec. 29, 2014);
DEP’T OF JUSTICE: NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION: A GUIDE FOR LAW
ENFORCEMENT 1 (1999); DAN SIMON, IN DOUBT: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE CRIMINAL JUS-
TICE PROCESS 82 (2012); Nyerere Davidson, Research in Brief: Eyewitness Identifications: A Na-
tional Survey on Procedures, THE POLICE CHIEF (2013), http://www.policechiefmagazine.org/
magazine/index.cfm?fuseaction=print_display&article_id=3060&issue_id=92013; INT’L ASS’N
OF POLICE CHIEFS & DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NAT’L SUMMIT ON WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS:
BUILDING A SYSTEMIC APPROACH TO PREVENT WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS 18 (2013); GAR-
RETT, supra note 15, at 52.
20. CUTLER & BULL KOVERA, supra note 15, at 37-38.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 38.
128 Michigan Journal of Race & Law [VOL. 21:125
from a photo array.23 The White clerks identified fifty-three percent of the
White customers correctly, forty percent of the African-American cus-
tomers correctly, and thirty-four percent of the Hispanic customers cor-
rectly.24 African-American clerks identified sixty-four percent of the
African-American customers correctly, fifty-five percent of the White cus-
tomers correctly, and forty-five of the Hispanic customers correctly.25
Hispanic clerks identified fifty-four percent of the Hispanic customers cor-
rectly, thirty-six percent of the White customers correctly, and twenty-five
percent of the African-American customers correctly.26
This study is indicative of the phenomenon of own-race bias. Own-
race bias suggests that “witnesses are more accurate at recognizing same-
race perpetrators than other-race perpetrators.”27 The mainstream scien-
tific community has accepted own-race bias as fact.28 As the New Jersey
Supreme Court noted in State v. Henderson, one “meta-analysis . . . in-
volving thirty-nine studies and nearly 5,000 identifications confirmed” the
existence of own-race bias.29 According to researchers June Chance and
Alvin Goldstein of the University of Missouri, Columbia, “All reviewers,
with one exception . . . [have] concluded that the other-race effect is
easily replicated and substantially affects subject accuracy in recognizing
faces.”30
Own-race bias is particularly disconcerting in the context of eyewit-
ness identifications, as the jurors who are meant to judge the credibility of
these identifications may not understand the complex issues surrounding
them.31 Eyewitness accounts often persuade juries, as “jurors tend to be-
lieve eyewitness accounts even in extremely doubtful circumstances.”32
Further, many potential jurors do not know about or believe in the exis-
tence of own-race bias.33 A study conducted at the University of Washing-





27. Id. at 37.
28. See, e.g., State v. Henderson, 208 N.J. 208, 267 (2011) (citing Christian A. Meissner
& John C. Brigham, Thirty Years of Investigating the Own-Race Bias in Memory for Faces: A Meta-
Analytic Review, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & LAW 3, 21 (2001)).
29. Id.
30. June E. Chance & Alvin G. Goldstein, The Other Race Effect and Eyewitness Identifica-
tion, in PSYCHOL. ISSUES IN EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION 153, 155 (Siegfried L. Sporer ed.,
1996).
31. Sheri Lynn Johnson, Cross-Racial Identification Errors in Criminal Cases, 69 CORNELL L.
REV. 934, 946-49 (1984).
32. Id. at 946.
33. Id.
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is more difficult to identify someone of a different race than their own.34
Another study indicated that eighty-four percent of prosecutors believe
that eyewitness identifications are “probably correct” ninety percent of the
time.35 Given the fact that prosecutors—trained legal professionals—do
not see the problems with eyewitness identifications, it is ambitious to be-
lieve that lay people serving on juries will think more critically about these
identifications.
Chance and Goldstein, two prominent researchers in the field of eye-
witness psychology, have noted that without a jury instruction or expert
testimony about the problems surrounding cross-racial identification, most
juries will not initiate a conversation about the credibility of a cross-racial
identification when evaluating the evidence.36 They suggest that many
judges are reluctant to allow a discussion in court about how frequently
misidentifications are made because they believe that juries are already
aware of own-race bias.37  Many judges think this because “‘they all look
alike to me’ has a long history of being a one-line gag used by both Black
and White stand-up comedians.”38 However, as Chance and Goldstein
point out, many jurors may be uncomfortable starting a discussion about
the issues surrounding cross-racial identifications without prompting from
a judge or expert because they do not want to be seen as “harbor[ing]
racist views.”39 Therefore, without expert testimony or jury instructions
on the topic, most jurors will not initiate a discussion about likelihood of
error in a cross-racial identification in their deliberations.40 Many judges
are also reluctant to exclude identifications or to comment on their relia-
bility because they feel that doing so would interfere with the traditional
function of the jury.41 This is a dangerous conundrum, for without com-
ment or information about the problems surrounding cross-racial identifi-
cations, juries may be deciding cases without all of the facts they need to
evaluate this type of eyewitness testimony.42
34. Id. at 947.
35. John P. Rutledge, They All Look Alike: The Inaccuracy of Cross-Racial Identifications, 28
AM. J. CRIM. L. 207, 209 (2001).




40. Id. at 173.
41. See, e.g., Dana Walsh, Note, The Dangers of Eyewitness Identification: A Call for Greater
State Involvement to Ensure Fundamental Fairness, 36 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 1415, 1440
(2013).
42. See ELIZABETH F. LOFTUS & JAMES M. DOYLE, EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY: CIVIL AND
CRIMINAL §1-5, §1-6 (1997) (describing studies that support the notion that juries place extra
emphasis on eyewitness testimony).
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Many scholars believe that understanding the cause of own-race bias
will help resolve cross-racial identification issues in criminal trials.43 While
no scientific study has concluded the cause of own-race bias, there are
three major hypotheses. The first is that some groups of faces may be in-
herently more difficult to identify and to remember.44 Most studies suggest
this is unlikely to be the cause, however, because it would mean that some
ethnic groups have more variability in their faces, which has been proven
untrue.45 One study has even shown that African-Americans have more
variability and distinct characteristics in their faces, which would mean
that this racial group would be easier to identify.46 Given the pervasive
issues of cross-racial identifications in the criminal justice system, the the-
ory that African-Americans are easier to identify has proven to be
untrue.47
The second hypothesis is that attitudes and stereotypes about certain
ethnicities impair or enhance an individual’s ability to identify people of
certain racial backgrounds.48 Attitudes are also unlikely to explain the
own-race bias because attitude encompasses too many other factors.49
The third hypothesis is that familiarity with certain ethnic groups
may affect one’s ability to identify them more easily.50 While many schol-
ars believe that familiarity is the most likely explanation for own-race bias,
this has not been consistently seen in field or laboratory studies.51 Never-
theless, more recent studies have shown “positive associations between
subject reports of contact and other-race face recognition,” meaning that
people who spend more time with people of different races more easily
identify people of other races.52 This partially supports the third hypothe-
sis: despite these studies, it is unclear what type of contact and how much
of it is needed to improve other-race facial recognition.53
Without more information about the cause or causes of own-race
bias, courts and law enforcement are left to determine how to best ensure
that it does not taint eyewitness identifications. This is concerning because
courts do not have many laws outside of constitutional rights to guide
them, as discussed in the following section, and because law enforcement




47. Id.; see also Eyewitness Misidentification, supra note 12.
48. See Chance & Goldstein, supra note 30, at 156.
49. Id. at 157.
50. Id. at 158.
51. Id. at 159.
52. Id. at 160.
53. Id.
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have not been trained on the issues surrounding cross-racial identification,
as discussed in Part III.
II. HOW COURTS ARE HANDLING THE CROSS-RACE EFFECT
Though own-race bias is well documented and accepted in the scien-
tific community, courts have been slow to accept these findings and to
incorporate them into criminal procedure.54 Part II will discuss Supreme
Court precedent on eyewitness identification, which fails to adequately
protect defendants who are on trial as a result of eyewitness misidentifica-
tions.55 Part II will also survey how state courts are addressing the problems
of cross-racial identification in the absence of Supreme Court guidance.
A. Supreme Court Precedent
As Justice William Brennan once wrote, “[T]here is almost nothing
more convincing than a live human being who takes the stand, points a
finger at the defendant, and says ‘That’s the one!’”56 Given the persuasive
nature of identifications, one would think that the Supreme Court would
have established a protective jurisprudence that regulates suggestive eyewit-
ness identification procedures carefully, but that is not the case. The
Court’s eyewitness identification jurisprudence focuses on suggestive po-
lice practices,57 but it has not addressed the scientific issues that go beyond
the suggestiveness of the procedures, such as own-race bias.
In Manson v. Brathwaite, the Supreme Court held that the Due Pro-
cess Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment includes the right to be free
from suggestive eyewitness identification procedures.58 Therefore, pre- and
post-indictment lineups, showups, and photo arrays are analyzed under a
due process inquiry.59 The inquiry begins with an analysis of whether the
54. See Stephen J. Saltzburg, REPORT TO HOUSE OF DELEGATES, 104D AMERICAN BAR
ASS’N CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTION, http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publish
ing/criminal_justice_section_newsletter/crimjust_policy_am08104d.authcheckdam.pdf (noting
that only five states have added a jury instruction regarding cross-racial identifications as of 2008).
55. See Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 113 (1977); Perry v. New Hampshire, 132 S.
Ct. 716, 720 (2012); United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 321 (1973); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S.
293, 296 (1967); CUTLER & BULL KOVERA, supra  note 15; GARRETT, supra note 15.
56. Watkins v. Sowders, 449 U.S. 341, 352 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing ELIZA-
BETH F. LOFTUS, EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY (1979)).
57. See Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98 (1977) (involving the suggestive use of a
single-photograph identification procedure).
58. Id. at 113 (“The standard, after all, is that of fairness as required by the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”) (citing Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98 (1977)).
59. Perry v. New Hampshire, 132 S. Ct. 716, 720 (2012) (“This Court has recognized
. . . a due process check on the admission of eyewitness identification, applicable when the police
have arranged suggestive circumstances leading the witness to identify a particular person as the
perpetrator of a crime.”); see also Ash, 413 U.S. at 321 (finding that a due process inquiry of the
photographic display remains open on remand).
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identification was police-orchestrated60 and whether it was unnecessarily
suggestive.61 In Perry v. New Hampshire, for instance, the Court held that
the victim’s identification of the defendant by spotting him through a win-
dow could not be excluded on due process grounds because the police had
not set up the identification or asked the victim to identify the defen-
dant.62 In another opinion, the Court provided the following examples of
situations that it would consider unnecessarily suggestive: when only one
person is shown, when the suspect is handcuffed, when the suspect is the
only person of his race, and when the police praise the witness’s choice.63
While detailing the procedures that make an identification unnecessarily
suggestive, the Court said that in emergencies, these procedures may be
allowed based on the circumstances.64 For example, if the victim is injured
and may die before identifying the suspect in a lineup, these procedures
would not violate a defendant’s due process rights.65
If the court determines that an out-of-court identification is police-
orchestrated and thereby unnecessarily suggestive, the trial court can still
allow the in-court identification. In Manson, the Court undercut its pro-
tection of defendants from false identifications by permitting “reliable” in-
court identifications.66 Yet, the Court has given very little guidance to trial
courts about what constitutes a “reliable” identification.67 Consequently,
trial judges, who are not well versed in the science of eyewitness identifica-
tions, allow into evidence many eyewitness identifications that are actually
unreliable.68
Even if a method of out-of-court identification is inherently sugges-
tive, a trial judge can determine that the in-court identification is reliable
and allow the witness to identify the defendant in court. A judge can only
begin to examine whether there is a substantial likelihood of mistaken
identification if that judge determines that an identification procedure was
police-orchestrated and unnecessarily suggestive.69 In Manson v.
60. Perry, 132 S. Ct. at 720.
61. Manson, 432 U.S. at 107. (“[T]he first inquiry was whether the police used an imper-
missibly suggestive procedure in obtaining the out-of-court identification.”).
62. Perry, 132 S. Ct. at 720.
63. See Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 295 (1967).
64. See id. at 302 (explaining that where the only witness is potentially going to die in
surgery, police can bring the defendant to do a showup in her hospital room).
65. See id.
66. Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 111 (1977).
67. See id. at 107.
68. After the initial suggestive procedure leads to a mistaken identification, many wit-
nesses affirm the identification in their minds and become more certain of it. See GARRETT,
supra note 15, at 49. One study found that trial records of 125 cases of false convictions clearly
showed police contamination of the eyewitness identifications. Brandon L. Garrett, Eyewitnesses
and Exclusion, 65 VAND. L. REV. 451, 475 (2012). Yet the identifications were allowed to pro-
ceed in court. See Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 111 (1977).
69. Perry v. New Hampshire, 132 S. Ct. 716, 720 (2012); see also id. at 112-14.
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Braithwaite, the Court provided factors that lower courts should consider
in determining whether there has been a substantial likelihood of misiden-
tification: the eyewitness’s opportunity to view the suspect, the degree of
attention paid by the eyewitness, the accuracy of the description as com-
pared to what the suspect actually looks like, the level of certainty the
witness has displayed, and the time between the crime and the
identification.70
There are two main issues with current Supreme Court case law re-
garding eyewitness identifications. The first is that a court will not even
look at the reliability of the identification unless the procedure was police-
orchestrated and unnecessarily suggestive.71 As a result, the scientific find-
ings about the cross-race effect will not even be considered unless the po-
lice used an unnecessarily suggestive technique.72 Nevertheless, the cross-
race effect will influence eyewitness testimony regardless of police proce-
dure. The second issue builds upon the first—under current Supreme
Court jurisprudence, trial judges can determine that an identification is
reliable even if suggestive police practices were used, but these judges can-
not determine that the identification is unreliable without suggestive po-
lice practices.73
The Supreme Court has not provided guidance for cross-racial iden-
tifications, and it has not required that trial judges consider these issues
when determining if an identification is reliable.74 Trial judges will only
look into the reliability of an identification if the procedure was unnecessa-
rily suggestive, meaning that the courts are solely concerned with initial
police behavior.75 The factors concerning the reliability of eyewitness
identifications will not be analyzed unless the police methods are of the
nature the Supreme Court termed unnecessarily suggestive.76  The courts
will not question the reliability of an eyewitness identification unless the
police used an inappropriate method of identification.
B. State Court Approaches
While the Supreme Court has not addressed the issues surrounding
cross-racial identification, the New Jersey Supreme Court has led the way
in eyewitness identification reform. Before State v. Henderson, New
Jersey used the due process standard that the Supreme Court set forth in
Manson v. Braithwaite.77 Then in State v. Henderson, the New Jersey
70. Manson, 432 U.S. at 114.
71. Perry, 132 S. Ct. at 720.
72. See id.
73. See GARRETT, supra note 15, at 53.
74. See Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 114 (1977).
75. Perry v. New Hampshire, 132 S. Ct. 716, 720, 730 (2012).
76. Id. at 730.
77. State v. Madison, 536 A.2d 254 (N.J. 1988).
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Supreme Court considered thirty years’ worth of scientific studies that had
been conducted since Manson and determined that the current protections
were inadequate.78
Before ruling in Henderson, the New Jersey Supreme Court ap-
pointed a “Special Master” to sift through all the current evidence on eye-
witness identifications and present a report on his/her findings.79 In that
report, the Special Master determined that “[t]he science abundantly
demonstrates the many vagaries of memory encoding, storage, and re-
trieval; the malleability of memory; the contaminating effects of extrinsic
information; the influence of police interview techniques and identifica-
tion procedures; and the many other factors that bear on reliability of eye-
witness identifications.”80
Based on these findings, the court determined that the “Manson/
Madison [test] does not adequately meet its stated goals: it does not pro-
vide a sufficient measure for reliability, it does not deter, and it overstates
the jury’s innate ability to evaluate eyewitness testimony.”81 Moreover, the
New Jersey Supreme Court determined that there were five significant
problems with the current approach: (1) defendants must show that police
procedures were “impermissibly suggestive” before courts can consider re-
liability; (2) three of the five factors that are used to determine reliability
depend on self-reporting by the eyewitnesses, which may not be reliable;
(3) the test may unintentionally reward suggestive police practices because
the more suggestive the practice, the more reliable a witness will seem; (4)
suppression is the only remedy, and most judges are hesitant to give such a
harsh punishment; and (5) the test asks that judges look at the “totality of
the circumstances” when making a reliability determination, but most only
use the five factors because there is no other guidance regarding what else
should be considered when examining the totality of the circumstances.82
Given these issues, the court revised the five-factor reliability test to
include an inquiry into all of the system and estimator variables83 that help
determine eyewitness reliability.84 The revised New Jersey test has four
78. State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 872, 917-18 (N.J. 2011).
79. After initially granting certiori and hearing oral argument on the case, the New Jersey
Supreme Court determined that it needed more information about the science of eyewitness
identification. Id. at 877. It remanded the case to a Special Master that it appointed, a retired
New Jersey Court of Appeals judge. Id. at 884. The Special Master was tasked with evaluating
scientific and other evidence about eyewitness identification on remand and made a determina-
tion about whether the research was credible. Id. at 877.
80. Id. at 916.
81. Id. at 918.
82. Id. at 918-20.
83. Id. at 921. A system variable is one that the legal system has control over, and an
estimator variable is one that the legal system cannot control. Id. at 895.
84. Id. at 918-20.
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steps.85 First, the defendant must “show some evidence of suggestiveness
that could lead to a mistaken identification.”86 Once the defendant has
met his initial burden, the State is required to show proof of reliability,
using both system and estimator variables.87 The defendant is ultimately
responsible for proving that there is a substantial likelihood of misidentifi-
cation by showing evidence of system and estimator variables, and he can
do so through cross-examination and the presentation of his own wit-
nesses.88 Finally, after weighing all of the evidence, the trial judge can
either decide to suppress the identification or provide “appropriate, tai-
lored jury instructions” that inform jurors that they should give weight to
the identification on the basis of its credibility.89
Most importantly, the New Jersey Supreme Court said that race-bias,
or a cross-racial identification, should be considered when a judge is
weighing the credibility of an identification under its new test.90 The court
allows defendants to present evidence about the flaws of cross-racial identi-
fications through the use of expert testimony and in cross-examination and
in closing arguments.91  Furthermore, the court requires a jury instruction
on cross-racial identification “whenever cross-racial identification is in is-
sue at trial.”92 This means that the jury will be educated about the issues
surrounding cross-racial identifications whenever one is presented at trial.
This instruction and the other reforms outlined above are immensely help-
ful in ensuring that juries are aware of the issues surrounding these types of
identifications.
Not all state supreme courts have agreed that it is their role to reform
eyewitness identifications. For example, the Washington Supreme Court
held in State v. Allen that a defendant’s due process rights are not violated
if the trial court refuses to instruct jurors on cross-racial eyewitness identi-
fications.93 The Supreme Court of Washington noted that a defendant has
other options for exposing the issues surrounding cross-racial identifica-
85. Id. at 920.
86. Id. To show suggestiveness, the defendant must point out issues with system variables,
including blind administration, pre-identification instructions, lineup construction, the feedback
provided to the witness, and recording confidence, multiple viewings, simultaneous versus se-
quential lineups, composites, or showups. Id. at 920-21.
87. Id. at 920. System variables are within the state’s control. Id. at 904-07. Estimator
variables are beyond the state’s control and relate to the “incident, the witness, or the perpetra-
tor.” Id. They include stress, weapon focus, duration, distance and lighting, witness characteris-
tics, characteristics of the perpetrator, memory decay, race-bias, private actors, and speed of
identification. Id.
88. Id. at 920.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 921.
91. Id. at 925.
92. Id. at 926.
93. State v. Allen, 294 P.3d 679, 687 (WASH. 2013) (en banc) (“We decline to adopt a
general rule requiring the giving of a cross-racial instruction in cases where cross-racial identifi-
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tions, including the “right to effective assistance of counsel, who can ex-
pose the unreliability in eyewitness’ testimony during cross examination
and focus the jury’s attention on the fallibility of eyewitness identification
during opening and closing arguments.”94 Most jurisdictions follow this
approach.95
As of 2008,96 the only states that require or authorize a jury instruc-
tion on cross-racial identifications are California, Utah, Massachusetts, and
New Jersey.97 These states have modeled their jury instructions on the
model instructions provided by Judge Bazelon in his concurring opinion
in United States v. Telfaire:
In this case the identifying witness is of a different race than the
defendant. In the experience of many it is more difficult to
identify members of a different race than members of one’s
own. If this is also your own experience, you may consider it in
evaluating the witness’s testimony. You must also consider, of
course, whether there are other factors present in this case
which overcome any such difficulty of identification. For ex-
ample, you may conclude that the witness has had sufficient
contacts with members of the defendant’s race that he would
not have greater difficulty in making a reliable identification.98
No federal circuits have endorsed Judge Bazelon’s instructions as of
2008.99
III. POLICE AND FEDERAL AGENCY PRACTICES AND REFORMS
The Innocence Project, an organization that works to overturn
wrongful convictions and one of the leading voices in the movement to
reform both police and courtroom eyewitness identification procedures,
notes on its website that “[d]espite solid and growing proof of the inaccu-
racy of traditional eyewitness ID procedures . . . traditional eyewitness
identifications remain among the most commonly used and compelling
cation is at issue, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to give a cautionary
cross-racial jury instruction under the facts of this case.”).
94. Id. at 685.
95. See Saltzburg, supra note 54, at 12.
96. These are the most recent comprehensive statistics available on states that require a
jury instruction on cross-racial identifications. See Commonwealth v. Bastaldo, 32 N.E.3d 873
(2015).
97. Saltzburg, supra note 54, at 12-14.
98. United States v. Telfaire, 469 F.2d 552, 561 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (Bazelon, J.,
concurring).
99. Saltzburg, supra note 54, at 11.
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evidence brought against criminal defendants.”100 Given the importance
the criminal justice system places on eyewitness evidence, and the fact that
many states have been hesitant to implement reforms, police agencies
should undertake eyewitness identification reform. This Part will examine
current police practices and evaluate proposed police practice reforms that
can help to stop mistaken identifications as the result of the cross-race
effect.
A. Current Police Practices
The Department of Justice took notice of the problems surrounding
eyewitness identifications in 1999, and it commissioned a guide to eyewit-
ness identification.101 The product of collaboration among thirty-four
prosecutors, police officers, and experts in the field of eyewitness identifi-
cation, the Department of Justice Guide was designed to aid “a jurisdiction
shaping its own protocols” surrounding eyewitness identification.102 The
Eyewitness Guide explains that it “is not intended to state legal criteria for
the admissibility of evidence;”103 the project was simply about reforming
police procedures without affecting the legal standard for the admissibility
of eyewitness evidence.104
The Eyewitness Guide provides detailed instructions for how law en-
forcement should handle eyewitness identifications, starting with the initial
report of the crime and ending with the actual identification procedure.105
While the Eyewitness Guide did not recommend the use of a double-blind
procedure, the Guide recommended this procedure in a 2013 joint report
with the International Association of Police Chiefs.106 Nevertheless, the
Eyewitness Guide is especially impressive because it seeks to incorporate
the “growing body of psychological knowledge regarding eyewitness evi-
dence” into its procedures, something it notes most police agencies and
courts have not yet done.107
The Eyewitness Guide also provides detailed procedures for creating
photo- and live-suspect lineups to help witnesses give more accurate iden-
tifications.108 These procedures include having a minimum of four fillers,
or non-suspects, for live lineups and five fillers for photo lineups and en-
100. Eyewitness Identification Reform, INNOCENCE PROJECT (June 10, 2015, 4:57 PM),
http://www.innocenceproject.org/free-innocent/improve-the-law/fact-sheets/eyewitness-iden
tification-reform.
101. DEP’T OF JUSTICE EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION GUIDE, supra note 19.
102. Id. at iii-iv.
103. Id. at 2.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 11.
106. INT’L ASS’N OF POLICE CHIEFS, supra note 19.
107. DEP’T OF JUSTICE EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION, supra note 19, at 1.
108. Id.
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suring that these fillers generally fit the description of the suspect or resem-
ble the suspect.109 These guidelines are meant to ensure that the suspect
does not “unduly stand out” of the lineup.110 Once the lineup is created,
the Eyewitness Guide details instructions on conducting the procedure,
starting with how the investigator is to instruct the witness.111 The focus of
the instruction should be that “the purpose of the identification procedure
is to exculpate the innocent as well as to identify the actual perpetrator.”112
The Eyewitness Guide also explains that the witness should be instructed
that the person who committed the crime may not be in the lineup and
assured that the police will continue to investigate “regardless of whether
an identification is made.”113
The Eyewitness Guide is most innovative in its recommendations for
the actual identification procedure. It provides instructions for police of-
ficers to conduct either sequential or simultaneous lineups.114 Perhaps
most notably, the Eyewitness Guide suggests that the police record any
identification results and witness’ statements of certainty after making
identifications,115 as studies have shown witnesses who pick a person
quickly and indicate that they are highly confident in their choice are con-
siderably more accurate.116 Therefore, getting a written record of the wit-
ness’s confidence at the time of the procedure would aid those assessing the
reliability of the identification. Furthermore, the Eyewitness Guide is clear
that the investigator should be careful not to say anything to the witness
after the identification procedure that would influence the witness’s confi-
dence in her decision.117
Despite the existence of the Eyewitness Guide and the importance of
eyewitness identifications, most police agencies have no written procedures
or trainings on conducting identifications.118 The National Institute of Jus-
tice conducted a national survey of police agencies regarding their eyewit-
ness identification procedures in September 2013.119 Photo lineups, where
the suspect is displayed along with other fillers through photographs, were
used by 94.1 percent of agencies, though 64.3 percent of those agencies
did not have a written policy on how to conduct such lineups.120 Show-
109. Id. at 29-31.
110. Id. at 29.
111. Id.
112. DEP’T OF JUSTICE EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION, supra note 19, at 31.
113. Id. at 32.
114. Id. at 33-36.
115. Id. at 33.
116. SIMON, supra note 19.
117. DEP’T OF JUSTICE EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION, supra note 19, at 34.
118. See Davidson, supra note 19.
119. Id.
120. Id.
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ups, where the suspect is shown to the witness in person without fillers,
were used by 61.8 percent of agencies, and 76.9 percent of those agencies
had no written policy about how to conduct them.121 Composites, where
police use a sketch artist or program to create a picture of the suspect based
on a witness’s recollection, were used by 35.5 percent of those surveyed,
90.6 percent of which lacked a written policy on the matter.122 Finally,
live lineups were used by 21.4 percent of agencies and 84 percent had no
written policy to inform their use.123 Furthermore, only 68 percent of
agencies that use photo lineups and 44 percent of agencies that use live
lineups provide training to their officers on how to conduct them, accord-
ing to this survey.124 The lack of written procedures and training is dis-
turbing, given the influence of eyewitness identifications on convictions.
While some may argue that police officers do not need to be trained
in eyewitness identification procedures and the problems that surround
them,125 one study showed why training is so desperately needed.126 The
study surveyed 500 police officers and found that only 30 percent were
aware of the steep drop in the memory of eyewitnesses with the passage of
time, with more than 50 percent of participants believing that it was possi-
ble to conduct a proper lineup after a witness had been exposed to a biased
lineup procedure.127 These results suggest that police officers are largely
unaware that poor procedures can contaminate eyewitness testimony. Even
an officer acting in good faith may not realize the impact that a certain
procedure may have on a witness. Therefore, training and written proce-
dures are necessary to ensure that eyewitness identifications are conducted
properly.
B. Proposed Innocence Project Reforms
While the Eyewitness Guide was an important step in eyewitness
identification reform, it did not go far enough in its recommendations.
The Innocence Project has compiled a list of suggested reforms that can
help improve the accuracy of eyewitness identifications.128 The Innocence
Project suggests some similar reforms to the Eyewitness Guide, such as
instructing the witness that the suspect may not be present, compiling the
lineup to have fillers that resemble the witness’s description, taking state-





125. See, e.g., Steven E. Clark, Eyewitness Identification Reform: Data, Theory, and Due Pro-
cess, PERSPECTIVES ON PSYCHOL. SCIENCE 7, 279 (May 2012).
126. SIMON, supra note 19, at 76.
127. Id.
128. Eyewitness Identification Reform, supra note 19.
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procedure, and documenting the lineup.129 The Innocence Project also
recommends two additional precautions: (1) double-blind procedures and
(2) the sequential presentation of lineups.130
Double-blind procedures mean that neither the administrator nor the
witness knows who the suspect is during the lineup.131 Administering
double-blind lineups ensures that the administrator cannot provide unin-
tentional suggestive cues to the witness while conducting the lineup.132
This is perhaps the most important reform that police agencies can under-
take in changing their eyewitness identification practices. Though there
has been limited scientific research done regarding double-blind proce-
dures, some studies suggest that when lineup administrators are aware of
the identity of the suspect, witnesses are more likely to indicate that per-
son.133 Though the administrators and the witnesses are often unaware of
the suggestiveness, the administrators may subconsciously influence the
witnesses by encouraging them to take another look if they do not pick
someone out initially or by removing photos of suspects more slowly when
the witnesses do not pick them out during sequential photo lineups.134
Though administrators with knowledge of the suspects may use these ap-
proaches subconsciously instead of with bad faith, the problem of influenc-
ing the outcome still remains. This problem is removed when the
administrator is unaware of the suspect.
The Innocence Project also recommends that police agencies use a
sequential lineup instead of a simultaneous lineup,135 as sequential lineups
have been shown to improve accuracy because witnesses cannot make a
relative, as opposed to an absolute, judgment.136 With sequential lineups,
where the witness is required to say yes or no before moving on to the
next picture or person, witnesses are required to make absolute judg-





133. SIMON, supra note 19, at 74.
134. Id.
135. A simultaneous lineup is when the eyewitness views a lineup or photo array in which
all of the individuals are shown at the same time, whereas a sequential lineup is when photo-
graphs or individuals are presented to the eyewitness one at a time. Eyewitness Identification Re-
form, supra note 19.
136. SIMON, supra note 19, at 71. When an eyewitness views a simultaneous lineup, she is
choosing who in the lineup looks most like the person she saw as compared to all of the people
in the lineup. Id. In a sequential lineup, she has to look at each person on his own and answer
whether that is the person she saw before she can See the next suspect. Id. This eliminates the
problem of comparing the people in the lineup and simply choosing who looks most similar to
the suspect. Id. Eyewitnesses will just choose the best option when presented with multiple
people at once. See id.
137. Id.
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believe that they choose the person that most resembles the perpetrator.138
As witnesses are already inclined to choose someone in a lineup, a simulta-
neous lineup enables them to choose the person who seems to most re-
semble the perpetrator.139 Since the problems of cross-racial identifications
already influence witnesses’ decisions,140 they should not be swayed by rel-
ative judgments as well. One study has shown that the use of sequential
lineups decreases false identifications without decreasing the rate of suspect
identifications.141
C. Other Ways to Improve the Accuracy of Cross-Racial Identifications
While the above reforms to eyewitness identification procedures will
certainly help with the fallibility of cross-racial identifications, and eyewit-
ness identifications in general, there are three additional reforms that police
agencies can implement to specifically help with the fallibility of cross-
racial identifications: (1) create photo and live lineups with proper fillers,
(2) reform procedures around composite sketches, and (3) use eyewitness
identification experts to train their officers about the problems of cross-
racial identifications.
Much of the literature surrounding cross-racial identification centers
on the problems that witnesses have identifying suspects of another race.142
Perhaps equally problematic, however, are the issues that police officers
have constructing live and photo lineups involving individuals of another
race.143 Own-race bias applies equally to the people who are charged with
constructing these lineups.144  A study conducted by Brigham and Ready
supports this premise.145 The study asked subjects to create two lineups for
two different suspects, one African-American and one White.146 Partici-
pants were given eighty photos and were tasked with creating lineups so
that the foils matched the general appearance of the suspect.147 The study
found that the subjects chose fewer photos as resembling the suspect of
their own race and more photos as resembling the suspect of another race,
meaning that the fillers were not as accurate for the suspect of the opposite
race.148 This exercise demonstrates how own-race bias can affect even the
composition of lineups. When possible, police agencies should have an
138. Id.
139. See id.
140. Id. at 63.
141. Id.
142. See, e.g., Chance & Goldstein, supra note 30, at 154-55.






142 Michigan Journal of Race & Law [VOL. 21:125
officer of the same race as the suspect create the lineups to ensure that the
fillers are not suggestive.149 While this recommendation is not always feasi-
ble, especially for small precincts, it could mitigate the issues of cross-racial
identifications.
Emerging technology could help to resolve own-race bias in police
officers. Computer programs may soon be able to create lineups for officers
from state or nationwide databases, and fillers could be pulled based on the
description of the suspect.150 Such programs could eliminate human error
or bias.151 Police agencies and legislatures should look into putting such
programs into practice to eliminate the human bias inherent in the con-
struction of lineups.
Another way that police agencies can help limit the fallibility of
cross-racial identifications is to reform their procedures regarding compos-
ite sketches. While composites are a very useful police tool, many studies
suggest that they are often incorrect and that they taint the witness’s mem-
ory.152 Furthermore, “the connection between face recognition memory
and verbal processes has been shown to be weak or nonexistent.”153 As a
result of the difficulty of describing the features of a perpetrator aloud,
composites are often flawed.154 The process of working with a sketch artist
or computer program can also distort the witness’s memory of the perpe-
trator.155 In the context of cross-racial identifications, at least one study
suggests that some witnesses focus mainly on the race of the perpetrator
and not on her features.156 These witnesses make for less than ideal wit-
nesses in the context of composite sketches.157 Therefore, police agencies
should use composites sparingly in cross-racial identifications.
Finally, while expert testimony about cross-racial identification is left
to the discretion of the trial courts,158 experts can inform police depart-
ments how to develop better eyewitness identification procedures and
training sessions.159 They can point out the flaws in certain lineups and
149. Id. at 173.
150. SIMON, supra note 19, at 86-89.
151. Id.
152. See State v. Lawson, 291 P.3d 673, 703 (Or. 2012).
153. Chance & Goldstein, supra note 30, at 164 (noting that good face describers are not
more skilled at remembering faces than bad face describers).
154. GARRETT, supra note 15.
155. See id. (detailing how in one exoneree’s case a witness said that it was only “after the
composite” that she began “looking and putting the pieces together myself of what I
remembered of that person’s face,” suggesting that the composite distorted her memory).
156. See Chance & Goldstein, supra note 30, at 164 (One study found that “[n]ine out of
10 Scottish subjects, in contrast to 3 out of 10 African subjects, weighted the racial identity
dimension most heavily in their judgments.”).
157. Id.
158. See infra Part IV.
159. Chance & Goldstein, supra note 30, at 173.
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help departments draft guidelines. While it is not feasible for all police
departments to have an eyewitness identification expert on their staffs, ex-
perts could be involved in national initiatives, like the Department of Jus-
tice Guide and the National Summit on Wrongful Convictions.160
Manuals informed by experts can assist departments of all sizes in creating
procedures that will lead to more accurate identifications.
IV. EXPERT TESTIMONY FOR INDIGENT DEFENDANTS
Circuit courts are increasingly allowing expert testimony on eyewit-
ness testimony issues,161 but there are still some that do not allow it.162 The
Sixth Circuit discussed the growing acceptance of experts on this topic in
United States v. Langan:
[Expert] testimony has been allowed in with increasing fre-
quency where the circumstances include “cross-racial identifi-
cation, identification after a long delay, identification after
observation under stress, and [such] psychological phenomena
as . . . unconscious transference.” Nonetheless, each court to
examine this issue has held that the district court has broad dis-
cretion in, first, determining the reliability of the particular tes-
timony, and, second, balancing its probative value against its
prejudicial effect.163
The practice of allowing eyewitness identification experts is growing,
but there are still many hurdles.164 Given this deference to the trial courts,
many Federal District Courts still do not allow expert testimony regarding
the cross-racial effect because it typically “consists of generalized notions
regarding the flaws of eyewitness testimony.”165 Moreover, evidentiary
rules require that the expert testimony pertain to the specific issues of the
case.166 Federal courts should establish a per se rule granting an expert
witness on the unreliable nature of cross-racial identification in cases where
the defendant is represented by a federal defender or indigent counsel and
160. See DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 19, at 34; INT’L ASS’N OF POLICE CHIEFS, supra note
19, at 29.
161. See, e.g., United States v. Langan, 263 F.3d 613, 621-22 (6th Cir. 2001).
162. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 148 F. App’x 867, 872 (11th Cir. 2005).
163. United States v. Langan, 263 F.3d 613, 621-22 (6th Cir. 2001) (internal citations
omitted). The Sixth Circuit referred to opinions of the Fourth, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits in
this passage. See id.
164. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 762 F. Supp. 2d 270, 275 (D. MASS. 2010), aff’d, 689
F.3d 12 (1st Cir. 2012).
165. See id.
166. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993) (“[U]nder the
Rules [of Evidence] the trial judge must ensure that any and all scientific testimony or evidence
admitted is not only relevant, but reliable.”).
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where the cross-racial identification is the primary piece of evidence
against the defendant.
The issue of cross-racial identification as it relates to indigent defend-
ants requires a per se exception, as juries should be informed of the issues
of such identifications to afford these defendants due  process. As previ-
ously indicated, eyewitness testimony and courtroom identifications are
extremely influential.167 Juries typically do not know about the issues sur-
rounding such testimony.168 To ensure fair trials, courts must give juries
some guidance about how much weight to give this testimony, especially
when it is the primary piece of evidence connecting a defendant to a
crime.
Even in courts that allow expert testimony, indigent defendants are
less likely to receive its benefit because they cannot afford to hire ex-
perts.169 The Criminal Justice Act, which provides counsel for indigent
defendants, outlines an additional application that indigent defendants
must submit to obtain an expert:
Counsel for a person who is financially unable to obtain investi-
gative, expert, or other services necessary for adequate repre-
sentation may request them in an ex parte application. Upon
finding, after appropriate inquiry in an ex parte proceeding,
that the services are necessary and that the person is financially
unable to obtain them, the court . . . shall authorize counsel to
obtain the services.170
In the context of eyewitness testimony, the Ninth Circuit has held that
“[a]ny weaknesses in eyewitness identification testimony can ordinarily be
revealed by counsel’s careful cross-examination of the eyewitnesses.”171
Therefore, to bring in expert testimony, “the defendant must establish
why such cross-examination is inadequate and why an expert is re-
quired.”172  Courts that have addressed this issue often follow Pitts in hold-
167. See, e.g., Watkins v. Sowders, 449 U.S. 341, 352 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
168. Chance & Goldstein, supra note 30, at 172.
169. See John M. West, Expert Services and the Indigent Criminal Defendant: The Constitutional
Mandate of Ake v. Oklahoma, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1326, 1326-28 (1986) (quoting United States v.
Johnson, 238 F.2d 565, 572 (1956) (Frank, J., dissenting)) (“ ‘The best lawyer in the world cannot
competently defend an accused person if the lawyer cannot obtain existing evidence crucial to
the defense, e.g., if the defendant cannot pay the fee of an investigator to find a pivotal missing
witness or a necessary document, or that of an expert accountant or mining engineer or chem-
ist. . . . In such circumstances, if the government does not supply the funds, justice is denied the
poor—and represents but an upper-bracket privilege.’”).
170. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(e)(1) (2006).
171. United States v. Labansat, 94 F.3d 527, 530 (9th Cir. 1996).
172. United States v. Pitts, 346 F. App’x 839, 841-42 (3d Cir. 2009).
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ing that expert testimony cannot come in because the unreliability of
cross-racial identification can be established through cross-examination.173
Cross-examination is insufficient to protect an indigent defendant
when the identification is the primary piece of evidence against him.
Given the weight that juries place on these identifications, they should be
alerted to the issues surrounding them. When a court-certified expert is
allowed to testify to these problems, juries will be more likely to bring
them up during deliberations and to weigh identifications accordingly.174
CONCLUSION
Although cross-racial identifications have consistently proven to be
problematic in the context of criminal prosecutions, the Supreme Court
and most state courts have refused to place limits on the use of these types
of identifications. While eyewitness identifications are an important tool
for police and prosecutors to use to solve crimes, reforms are needed to
ensure that their use is proper and promotes accurate identifications. State
courts have started to implement some reforms, and police departments
can supplement these measures with practices like double-blind procedures
and the sequential presentation of lineups, which are designed to ensure
that the correct suspect is apprehended. As Justice Harlan famously wrote
in In re Winship, “[I]t is far worse to convict an innocent man than to let
the guilty go free.”175 With Justice Harlan’s foundational principle in
mind, Congress and the federal courts should re-examine their rules re-
garding expert testimony and cross-racial identifications and to provide ex-
pert testimony for those who cannot otherwise afford it. These measures
would help prevent mistaken identifications and thereby prevent the
wrongful convictions that inevitably follow.
173. See, e.g., United States v. Rodriguez-Felix, 450 F.3d 1117, 1128-29 (10th Cir. 2006)
(“affirm[ing] the district court’s evidentiary rulings denying expert psychological testimony on
the general reliability of eyewitness identification”).
174. See AM. BAR ASS’N, Report to the House of Delegates, 2008 A.B.A. SEC. CRIM. JUST. 15
(citing People v. Beckford, 532 N.Y.S.2d 462, 465 (S. CT. KINGS CTY. 1988)) (“Jurors are more
apt to comfortably discuss racial differences without fear of discord in the jury room when they
have received testimony from an expert considering the possible influence of racial differences as
affecting the accuracy of the identification. Also, they argue that the possibility of error in cross-
racial identifications is not within the ordinary knowledge of many jurors.”).
175. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 372 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
